Abstract--Control system requirements for highly automated and survivable future electric warships are presented herein to stimulate and unify interdisciplinary research conducted under the joint NSF/ONR Electric Power Networks Efficiency and Security (EPNES) initiative. This ONR challenge problem focuses on continuity of control for interdependent shipboard engineering and damage control systems under hostile conditions. The mission statement for these Hull, Mechanical, Electrical & Damage Control (HME&DC) systems may be summarized as: Provide continuous mobility, power, and thermal management for shipboard combat systems despite major disruptions involving cascading failures. This challenge problem is prototypical of analogous complex, interdependent systems including the national power grid, military and civilian infrastructure, and transport systems. These nonlinear, distributed, heterogeneous, variable structure systems contain dynamically interdependent subsystems. Mission/life critical system integrity and fault tolerance requirements demand dependable continuity of service. Innovative, dependable, and affordable control system architectures, strategies, algorithms, methods and tools are sought. After a brief problem statement and discussion of shipboard control systems, the ONR control challenge problem and reference system are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
uture Navy surface combatants will be commissioned with significantly higher demands for electric power to support electric drive propulsion, high-energy weapon systems, electrical auxiliary systems, and network centric warfare. These interdependent and automated systems require dependable, integrated control to dynamically and efficiently manage limited resources. This requirement is critical during the major disruptions associated with battle and damage control operations. These systems must also be economically supportable throughout a design-to-decommissioning time span of approximately 50 years.
An illustrative example of system interdependence involves the electrical power system, cooling systems, and combat systems. High power density electrical power and energy weapons require cooling. Today this cooling is provided through a distributed chilled water system. To chill the water for cooling, electric power is required to operate the refrigeration equipment and circulation pumps. High-energy weapon systems tend to be pulsed with large transient demands for electrical power and cooling. Moreover, combat sensing and information management systems' power quality and continuity requirements limit disruptions to tens of milliseconds. The automation system must rapidly distinguish between normal and casualty transients, dynamically reconfiguring interdependent systems under stressful battle conditions. Furthermore, continuous, accurate situational awareness is dependent upon vulnerable, distributed sensing and communication systems which also rely on continuous power delivery. Because shipboard power components form tightly coupled finite inertia systems, faults can readily propagate into overall system failures.
Solid-state power conversion and switchgear introduce the capability to quickly isolate faults avoiding system disruption or failure. In summary, the electric power grid presents the most challenging shipboard support system control problem.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT PRELIMINARIES
There is an urgent need for innovative methods and tools to formulate, design, validate, operate, and maintain dependable control systems for mission/life critical, complex, interdependent systems [1] - [3] . Of particular interest is the survivable, automated control of advanced, integrated electrical power systems [4] - [5] . The essential goal is to provide continuous mobility, power, and thermal management for shipboard combat systems despite major disruptions involving cascading failures.
Innovative research that directly contributes to a more robust automation infrastructure is required. This research initiative emphasizes continuity of services in lieu of traditional reliability and availability metrics. Traditional error recovery and error masking techniques are poorly suited to complex, interactive, hard real-time systems.
Furthermore, the increasing dependence on complex, commercial-off-the-shelf electronic and software technology requires algorithms that minimize the susceptibility to catastrophic, common mode failures. Analogously, computer and communication systems often employ error-correcting codes to detect and correct single and multi-bit errors. Conceptually, the control system equivalent of an error correcting code is sought [6] . The desired system must maintain situational awareness and control authority despite a variety of component failures, internal errors, and exogenous disturbances. Figure 1 . Given a nominal plant model, g(t), well known techniques can be used to design and implement the feedback controller h(t) to attain specified stability, performance, and robustness requirements. These techniques have been extended to accommodate certain classes of nonlinearities, uncertainties, and disruptions shown notionally in Figure 2 . Insufficient theory and practice exist to dependably control complex, interdependent systems subjected to hostile disruption. Control system failure modes include damaged hardware, inadequate control/reconfiguration algorithms, software errors, communication failures, and sensor failures. These temporal and spatially clustered "bursts" of events are much more disruptive than random failures. Moreover, the consequences of outages under hostile conditions may be disastrous.
B. Survivable Systems
While survivability is a well-known and often studied metric in military systems, until recently, little attention has been paid to this metric in the civilian sector. Historical methods for improving survivability include redundancy, spatial separation, and manual backup systems. Traditionally, cost and technical challenges have restricted the use of high integrity, fault tolerant systems to a limited set of high-risk systems. Examples include aero vehicle control and nuclear applications.
In the commercial sector, deregulation and loss of excess capacity [9] - [12] have made maintaining the uninterrupted service expected by consumers progressively more difficult. Moreover, catastrophic electrical power infrastructure failures have been attributed to minor, local disturbances [7] . Although the industry standard induction motor is still the largest single electric load type in use, there has been a rapid and significant increase in the number of power electronic loads including: rectifiers, solid state motor drives, converters, and switching power supplies. These new loads are highly non-linear, inject significant harmonics, and challenge traditional analysis and control techniques. There are many parallels between the military ship attempting to survive a missile attack and a hospital or securities trading firm trying to survive a natural disaster or terrorist attack. A general approach for deploying more survivable systems will benefit both the military and civilian sectors.
The U.S. Navy's recent experience with battle damage underscores the need for survivable engineering and damage control systems. In the late 1980's, the USS Stark was struck by two Exocet air-to-surface missiles causing extensive damage and fire in the forward part of the ship. Two years later, the USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a mine and was nearly severed in two. She suffered flooding in the main engine room and two of her three auxiliary machinery rooms. The USS Princeton also struck a mine shortly thereafter. While never in danger of sinking, she required extensive repairs before returning to service. Recently in October 2000, the USS Cole suffered a terrorist attack wherein a bomb-laden boat blew a large hole in the side of her forward engine room. She suffered progressive flooding into both auxiliary machinery rooms and the after engine room. Common to all these events is the fact that each of these ships lost all electric power, hampering the crews' efforts to save their ships.
Everything aboard a modern warship from fire pumps to the sophisticated weapons systems and computer networks depends on electric power to operate. The electric power grid of any ship is by far the most important support system aboard Navy ships. The electric power grid complexity, speed of response, and stability requirements dominate the shipboard support systems. Therefore, the ONR Control Challenge benchmark problem is a representative integrated electric power system. Advanced electric propulsion applications and technology for military ships and ground vehicles mirror trends in the commercial sector. In both applications, high power density solid-state converters and drives allow the power system coupling to be actively controlled. Considerable system survivability improvements may be accrued from a relatively modest control system investment. This is the fundamental motivation for innovations in robust, trustworthy automation and control for distributed, networked, interdependent infrastructures for both civilian and military applications.
In addition to electric propulsion, future electric warships will include high power weapons and sensors that will put new demands on the distribution and control of electric power by introducing individual loads that are of the same magnitude as the power generation units. This presents the finite inertia shipboard power grid with the challenge of differentiating normal operational transients from fault or damage conditions.
Another aspect of the electric warship is the precept of elimination of mass (e.g. fluid) transport via electrification of ship functions. This helps to simplify the interdependencies between the electric power system and the fluid systems which provide cooling for the mission loads. The following discussion describes the ONR reference problem in more detail and touches on some of the ongoing research. 
B. Control Challenge
Automation of shipboard systems is driven by cost and performance constraints which may be summarized as [13] :
• The need to shift functions from humans to machines to reduce operational costs • Control law complexity and time constraints which exceed human capabilities.
Most existing automation systems exhibit "brittle" behavior in response to non-trivial faults and failures. When subjected to significant failures or damage, brittle systems typically shut down inappropriately and/or lose stability. Conversely, dependable systems provide resilient, nonstop operation of mission/safety critical systems with provable system integrity and fault tolerance.
The research objective is cost-effective, innovative control strategies which enable pervasive, industrial automation technologies to be applied to the dependable automation problem. Dependable automation strategies include:
• Extensions to stabilizing non-linear control theory • Generalization of analytic redundancy
• Integrating component level intelligent distributed control into robust networks • Model based and non parametric estimation and forecasting • Robust sensing and situational awareness • Analysis, design, and control algorithms for complex, interdependent systems
Traditionally, reliable systems utilize hardware redundancy to protect against hardware-based failures. This approach is not valid for complex interactive networks and systems, is vulnerable to common mode and common cause failures, and is not affordable. A key aspect of complex dependable systems may involve the hierarchical/functional decomposition into trusted subsystems which cooperate via implicit and/or explicit communication. Modular decomposition is desired to:
• Reduce the apparent complexity • Build complex systems in a structured, incremental manner • Allow incremental replacement of obsolete technologies
Highly integrated supervisory control functions are expected to operate and cooperate via a generic ubiquitous computing infrastructure. These supervisory control functions could be implemented as intelligent software agents which execute on any available computer. Component level intelligence is expected to be collocated with mission critical equipment.
Implementing supervisory control within the vehicle's information infrastructure provides a feature rich environment fully integrated with tactical decision-making, maintenance, and administration. These supervisory functions are highly available due to their ability to execute on any available generic computers. Due to complexity of the ship wide networked computer system and software-based application programs, this infrastructure may be vulnerable to hostile disruptions and common mode failures. Automated, graceful degradation, of safety and mission critical backup control functions is required. System integrity and fault tolerance is dependent on both the level of redundancy and the redundancy management strategy. Analytic redundancy may provide a fundamentally new paradigm for redundancy management.
V. ONR CONTROL CHALLENGE REFERENCE PROBLEM
The ONR control challenge reference problem is presented to motivate and focus interdisciplinary research efforts. The reference problem and associated research objectives are intended as research guidance and should not be considered definitive or exhaustive. This research thrust emphasizes continuity of vital power, fluid, and communication services in lieu of traditional reliability and availability metrics. Future electric warships must provide mobility, power, and cooling management to sophisticated combat systems. These mission critical services must be continuously available under highly lethal combat conditions. In the heat of battle, a ship that goes dark cannot fight, putting the overall mission in jeopardy, and potentially dooming the ship to complete destruction. The USS Stark, Roberts, Princeton, and Cole incidents all left modern, U.S. warships dark and dead in the water. Machinery controls for existing U.S. Naval engineering and damage control provide centralized, remote control with manual backup systems. Intelligence resides in the human operators, not the control system. As our ships become more complex, are manned more austerely, and are expected to continue to fight despite battle damage, existing control strategies will no longer be adequate.
The ability to fight through combat damage such as an antiship missile detonation requires systems which can sense, isolate, and quickly compensate for major disruptions. Modern military and civilian systems share a fundamental challenge: to ensure continuity of service for distributed mission and life critical services despite both natural and hostile disruptions. In this challenge problem, the system includes a spatially distributed, non-linear, variable structure physical plant and the associated hybrid sensing, communication, control, and actuation facilities. Damage is assumed to be clustered spatially and temporally resulting in concurrent disruption of both the physical plant and the control system. In both the civilian and the military sectors, the complexity and interdependence of emerging infrastructure technologies requires new strategies, methods, and tools. The primary objective is the derivation of innovative control strategies and algorithms that maximize continuity of service despite faults and failures. Time domain simulation will be the primary assessment tool for continuity of service. It is anticipated that promising innovations will receive subsequent, proof-of-concept, reduced scale hardware demonstrations.
A future surface combatant with a solid-state, integrated electric power system will supply approximately 100 MW of power to propulsion, ship's service, and weapon systems. This power generation, distribution, and consumer network is also dependent upon the delivery of chill water for cooling management. The ONR reference system is based on representative, nonproprietary, reduced scale, integrated power system testbeds established at the University of Missouri-Rolla and Purdue University under a related Naval Combat Survivability initiative.
The Purdue testbed provides the prototypical AC propulsion drive with a provision for a future pulse weapons system load. Ship service power supplies convert AC propulsion power to DC for zonal electrical distribution. The DC zonal electrical distribution prototypical testbed is located at the University of Missouri-Rolla.
The ONR control challenge reference system is a composite of the Purdue University and University of Missouri-Rolla testbeds. The reference systems has been configured to be:
• Representative of future shipboard integrated power systems • Traceable to existing, non-propriety hardware • Available for control system design and simulation in mathematical and MATLAB/Simulink compatible forms.
The ONR Control Challenge reference system is presented in Figure 3 . Over the past decade, considerable effort has been made to define and refine power system architectures that are both affordable and survivable. The ONR reference system contains the minimum elements to represent an advanced integrated power system. System characteristics include:
1. Two finite inertia AC sources and buses 2. AC bus dynamics, stability, and regulation 3. Redundant DC power supplies and zonal distribution buses 4. DC bus dynamics, stability, and regulation 5. Three zonal distribution zones feed by redundant DC power buses 6. A variety of dynamic and nonlinear loads An actual ship would have a more complex configuration with additional generator capacity.
The control challenge is to provide power continuity and regulation despite large variations in power demand, component failures, internal errors, and hostile system disruptions. Solid-state conversion modules introduce the potential to actively control the coupling between various system components and prevent the propagation of faults. The control challenge problem is a representative, finite inertia, tightly coupled, isolated shipboard power system. Specific research objectives include:
1. Control system integrity and fault tolerance despite component failures, internal errors, and hostile disruptions involving cascading failures 2. Robust, real-time situational awareness with graceful degradation of power system performance despite component failures, internal errors, and hostile disruptions involving cascading failures 3. Continuity of power and thermal management for critical loads despite large load transients, nonlinear system dynamics, component failures, internal errors, and hostile disruptions involving cascading failures 4. Self-organizing and self-healing operation which minimizes requirements for human intervention, calibration, maintenance, and repair 5. Modular functional decomposition which leverages existing and emerging technology and standards to obtain implementation simplicity, affordability, and life cycle supportability 6. Innovative power, fluid, control and communication system architectures and control strategies which minimize subsystem interdependence 7. Improved quality of service despite reductions in operating margins.
Time domain simulation will be the primary tool to access system performance.
VI. SUMMARY
Innovative research that directly contributes to a survivable and affordable automation infrastructure is sought. This research initiative emphasizes hard, real-time continuity of services in lieu of traditional reliability and availability metrics. Furthermore, the increasing dependence on complex, commercial-off-the-shelf electronic and software technology requires algorithms that minimize the susceptibility to catastrophic, common mode failures. Analogously, computer and communication systems often employ error-correcting codes to detect and correct single and multi-bit errors. Conceptually, the control system equivalent of an error correcting code is sought [6] . The desired system must maintain situational awareness and control authority despite a variety of component failures, internal errors, and exogenous disturbances.
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